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De Vos et al.: Updates from the Regional Human Rights Systems

UPDATES FROM THE REGIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS SYSTEMS
AFRICA
THE AFRICAN HUMAN RIGHTS SYSTEM began
to take shape under the Organization of
African Unity (OAU), which was founded in
1963. The African Union (AU) replaced the
OAU in July 2001 following the ratification of
the AU’s Constitutive Act. The AU has dominion over three mechanisms responsible for
enforcing human rights treaties signed by
member states. The African Charter on
Human and Peoples’ Rights (Charter) (entered
into force in 1986) established the African
Commission (Commission) on Human and
Peoples’ Rights, which is responsible for hearing cases brought against States Parties to the
treaty. The African Charter on the Rights and
Welfare of the Child (entered into force in
1999) created the African Committee on the
Rights and the Welfare of the Child to enforce
compliance of that treaty. Finally, the Protocol
on the Establishment of an African Court on
Human and Peoples’ Rights (entered into force
in January 2004) established a court for
enforcement of the African Charter on Human
and Peoples’ Rights. At the time of publication, the African Court on Human and
Peoples’ Rights was not yet operational.
Under Article 59 of the African Charter on
Human and Peoples’ Rights, the Assembly of
Heads of States and Governments of the
African Union must grant its permission
before decisions on human rights disputes
(Communications) brought before the
Commission can be publicly released. The following is a summary of recently released
Communications from the Commission’s
35th Ordinary Session held in Banjul,
Gambia from May 21 to June 4, 2004. The
Communications summarized below were
published by the Centre for Human Rights at
the University of Pretoria in South Africa.

outlawed slavery by decree in 1981, and memorialized this decree in the country’s Constitution
in 1991, the local court ruled in favor of the
alleged owner and the Mauritanian Supreme
Court upheld that decision.

Andrew Chigovera, a former prosecutor and
Attorney General from Zimbabwe, as the
Special Rapporteur for a six month period
that will end at the same time as his term on
the Commission.

In its decision, the Commission noted that
“the consequences of slavery still persist” in
Mauritania despite the official government ban
on the practice. The Commission stated that
Bah Ould Rabah succeeded in creating doubt
as to the authenticity of the donation of land
his mother allegedly made to her “owner.” The
Commission held that the failure to prove a
specific reason why a mother would deny her
children the right of inheriting her land “is not
in conformity with the protection of the right
to property” under Article 14 of the African
Charter. The Commission called upon
Mauritania to “persevere in [its] efforts so as to
control and eliminate all offshoots of slavery.”

Due to the inability to complete all activities during the scheduled session, the
Commission decided to hold an Extra
Ordinary Session from March 15-19, 2005, in
Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. The 37th Ordinary
Session of the African Commission on Human
and Peoples’ Rights was held from April 27 to
May 11, 2005, in Banjul, Gambia.

ODJOUORIBY COSSI PAUL V. BENIN
The Commission ruled that the
Government of Benin violated Article 7(1)(d)
of the Charter by failing to decide a property
dispute brought by Mr. Odjouoriby Cossi Paul
in a timely manner. Mr. Odjouoriby filed an
appeal in September 1995 with the Benin
Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals failed
to adjudicate the case for 10 years. The
Commission ruled that the inaction on the
claim, including the Court’s failure to respond
to inquiries from the Commission, constituted
undue delay in violation of the African
Charter’s right to a trial within a reasonable
time. The Commission requested that the
Republic of Benin take measures to rectify the
delay and urged the Court to compensate
Mr. Odjouoriby for damages he suffered due
to the delay. The Commission refused to rule
on the merits of the property dispute because
the case has not received final adjudication in
the national courts.

BAH OULD RABAH V. MAURITANIA
In a 6-1 decision, the Commission ruled
that Bah Ould Rabah and his family were
wrongfully deprived of their ancestral home
after the death of their mother, a former slave. The
alleged property owner, the former slave owner of
the mother, produced documents to prove that
the mother had twice donated the land to him,
once in 1971 and again in 1972. The 1972 donation was allegedly to secure her daughter’s
freedom from slavery. Although Mauritania

SUBSEQUENT COMMISSION SESSIONS
The 36th Ordinary Session of the African
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights
took place in Dakar, Senegal, from November
23 to December 7, 2004. During the session,
the Commission adopted a resolution outlining the mandate of the Special Rapporteur on
Freedom of Expression in Africa. The
Commission also appointed Commissioner
29

BENIN
A U.S. Federal District Court ordered the
Titan Corporation to pay criminal and civil
fines totaling $28.5 million for violating the
Foreign Corrupt Practice Act (FCPA), which
bars American companies from bribing foreign
officials. Titan, a U.S. corporation, admitted to
bribing government officials in Benin and
funneling over $2 million into President
Mathieu Kerekou’s re-election campaign in
2001. Titan, a California-based defense and
telecommunications firm, paid the money in
hopes that the government of Benin would
increase the fees the company received for
managing a telephone network project in the
country. Shortly after President Kerekou won
re-election, Titan’s fee quadrupled to an estimated $9.1 million.
The $28.5 million is the largest fine ever
levied on an American company under the
FCPA. The U.S. Attorney prosecuting the case
stated that the decision put U.S. corporations
on notice that bribing foreign officials will not
be tolerated.
Titan Wireless, the unit of the company
that operated in Benin, ceased operations in
2002. It is not known whether President
Kerekou was aware of the bribes, and the
United States has no plans to bring charges
against him.

ZIMBABWE
Parliamentary elections were held in
Zimbabwe on March 31, 2005, despite
warnings from Zimbabwean civic groups that
violence and intimidation would likely keep
many voters away from the polls.

Human Rights Brief, Vol. 12, Iss. 3 [2005], Art. 8
Leading up to the elections, officials from
the main opposition party, the Movement
for Democratic Change (MDC), claimed
Zimbabwean government soldiers attacked
several of the party’s candidates as they campaigned on at least two separate occasions in
February. An MDC spokesman alleged that
while the soldiers were beating and kicking
MDC candidate Gabriel Chiwara and his campaign manager, they accused the men of “selling the country to the British.” The police are
said to be investigating the claims.
Gordon Moyo of the Bulaweyo Agenda, a
civic education group in Zimbabwe, asserted
that political violence, including the arbitrary
arrest of opposition officials, is on the rise in
urban areas. Mr. Moyo also stated that many
people feared they might lose food aid if they
voted for the opposition. Zimbabwe continued
to experience severe food shortages and the
Famine Early Warning System Network estimated that five million Zimbabweans are in
need of food aid.
Dr. Reginald Matchaba-Hove, chairman of
the Zimbabwe Election Support Network
(ZESN), told the United Nation’s IRIN news
agency prior to the elections that intimidation,
coupled with the experiences of the last election, would prevent many opposition supporters from voting. “They would rather not go to
vote than vote and face the recriminations. Past
experience has taught them that such threats
are eventually carried out. . . . The penalty for
voting for the opposition can be an expulsion
from the village, physical violence, withdrawal
from the local food aid registers, or all of them
combined.”
The New York-based Committee to
Protect Journalists expressed concern about the
government’s intimidation of independent
reporters. Government investigators, alleging
espionage, raided the offices of three freelance
reporters who contribute to the Associated
Press, the London Times, and the Bloomberg
news agency. The Broadcasting Authority of
Zimbabwe announced on February 16, 2005,
that all parties and candidates would have
equal access to government media. Some
opposition groups claimed that although they
were gaining greater access, it paled in comparison to that of the ruling Zanu-PF party.

EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS
THE EUROPEAN COURT of Human Rights
(Court) was established in 1959 by the
European Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
(Convention). The Court is charged with

enforcing the obligations entered into by those
states who are party to the Convention. Any
State Party or individual claiming to be a victim of a Convention violation may lodge a
complaint with the Court. In its decisions, the
Court takes into account the various legal
systems of the Contracting States.

KHASHIYEV AND AKAYEVA V. RUSSIA;
ISAYEVA, YUSUPOVA AND BAZAYEVA
V. RUSSIA; ISAYEVA V. RUSSIA
On February 24, 2005, the Court delivered
its judgment in a series of cases lodged in 2000
by six Chechens who accused the Russian army
of committing serious abuses, including torture and extrajudicial killing, in its on-going
conflict with the self-proclaimed breakaway
Republic of Chechnya. The Court’s decisions
marked the first time an international court
has found Russia guilty of serious human
rights violations during the course of the
decade-long conflict.
In each case, the applicants alleged that the
Russian government’s attempts to investigate
and prosecute the alleged crimes were ineffective. The case of Khashiyev and Akayeva v.
Russia concerned allegations that members of
the Russian army in Grozny tortured and
executed the applicants’ relatives. At the end of
January 2000, the bodies of Mr. Khashiyev’s
brother and sister, two of his nephews, and
Ms. Akayeva’s brother were found with numerous gunshot wounds. The Russian government
began a criminal investigation in May 2000,
which was suspended and reopened several
times, but never identified those responsible
for the killings. The case of Isayeva, Yusupova
and Bazayeva v. Russia accused the Russian
military of the indiscriminate bombing of
civilians leaving Grozny on a highway on
October 29, 1999. As a result of the bombing,
Ms. Isayeva and Ms. Yusupova were wounded,
Ms. Isayeva’s two children and daughter-in-law
were killed, and Ms. Bazayeva’s car containing
her family’s possessions was destroyed. The
government opened a criminal investigation
into the bombardment in May 2000, but later
closed the investigation when a Russian court
found that the military actions were legitimate
and proportional to the circumstances. An
appeal of this decision is still pending before a
military court. The case of Isayeva v. Russia also
accused the Russian military of indiscriminately bombing the Chechen village of Katyr-Yurt
on February 4, 2000, resulting in the deaths of
Ms. Isayeva’s son and three nieces. The government opened a criminal investigation into the
matter in September 2000, but closed it in
2002 after finding that the military’s conduct
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was legitimate in the circumstances as a
response to a large group of illegal fighters who
had occupied the village and refused to surrender. An appeal of this decision is also pending.
In lodging their complaints, applicants
Khashiyev, Akayeva, Isayeva, and Yusupova
invoked violations of Convention Article 2
(right to life), Article 3 (prohibition against
torture and inhuman or degrading treatment),
and Article 13 (right to an effective remedy).
Ms. Bazayeva also invoked violations of these
articles, as well as an Article 1 violation under
Protocol No. 1, which guarantees that every
person is “entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of
his possessions.” On December 19, 2002, the
Court declared all counts admissible. The
Court decided that Russia’s preliminary objection on the ground that the applicants had
failed to exhaust their domestic remedies, as
required by Article 13, was closely linked to
the merits of the complaints and should be
considered with the merits at the next stage of
the proceedings. The public hearing subsequently took place in Strasbourg, France, on
October 14, 2004.
With respect to the Russian government’s
preliminary objection, the Court held that the
applicants were not obliged to pursue the civil
remedies provided for under Russian law, given
that, at the date of the Court’s admissibility
decisions, the absence of results from the criminal investigations meant that Russia’s Supreme
Court and other domestic courts were incapable of considering the merits of any claim
relating to the alleged criminal actions. This
decision was unanimous for four of the applicants, but Judge Vladimiro Zagrebelsky of Italy
dissented in Khashiyev and Akayeva v. Russia,
noting that the inconclusive nature of the
criminal investigations in that case did not
necessarily prevent the applicants from vindicating their rights before a Russian civil court.
Indeed, Mr. Khashiyev had succeeded in
bringing a damage action before the Nazran
District Court. Although Mr. Khashiyev was
unable to pursue any independent investigation into the person(s) responsible for the
assaults, the court did award damages based on
the “common knowledge of the military
superiority of Russian federal forces in the . . .
district at the relevant time, and a general
liability of the State for actions by the military.” Judge Zagrebelsky conceded, and the
majority held, that the lack of an effective
criminal investigation might hinder Article
13’s “effective remedy” provision in certain
cases, but he did not consider applicants
Khashiyev and Akayeva to be so encumbered.
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With respect to the Article 2 allegations,
the Court held unanimously in each case that
the government violated the Convention on
both substantive and procedural grounds. In
Khashiyev and Akayeva, the Court noted that
the government had submitted only about
two-thirds of the criminal investigation file.
On the basis of these submissions, the Court
established that Russian military personnel
had killed the applicants’ relatives. The
government did not offer any other plausible
explanation for the cause of the deaths or any
justification for the use of such lethal force.
Accordingly, the Court concluded that there
were Article 2 violations.
In Isayeva, Yusupova and Bazayeva, the
Court found it undisputed that the applicants
had been subjected to an aerial missile attack
by Russian forces, but noted that its ability to
assess the legitimacy of the attack and the
manner of its execution was hampered by the
government’s failure to submit a copy of the
complete investigation file. The government
claimed that the attack had been to protect
persons from unlawful violence within the
meaning of Article 2, Section 2 of the
Convention, which creates an exception for
“the use of force, which is no more than
absolutely necessary . . . in defense of any
person from unlawful violence.” Nevertheless,
the Court concluded that the Russian military
was aware that a “humanitarian corridor”
stretching from Grozny to Ingushetia existed at
the time of the attack, that the existence of the
corridor “should have been known to authorities who were planning military operations
anywhere near the Rostov-Baku highway,” and
that the presence of civilians therein should
have alerted the military to “the need for
extreme caution as regards the use of lethal
force.” Furthermore, the weapon used in the
attack, a 12 S-24 non-guided air-to-ground
missile, was so powerful that anyone who had
been on the stretch of the road in question at
the time of attack would have been in “mortal
danger.” Consequently, the Court found that,
even assuming the Russian military had been
pursuing a legitimate defensive aim at the
time, it had not planned or executed its attack
with “the requisite care for the lives of civilians.” Consistent with this finding, the Court
also held that Ms. Bazayeva’s rights were
violated under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1,
noting that the attacks “constituted grave and
unjustified interferences with the applicant’s
peaceful enjoyment of her possessions.”

Similar facts were at issue in Isayeva v.
Russia. The Court found it undisputed that the
Russian government attacked the applicant
and her relatives as they attempted to flee
heavy fighting in the Chechen province of
Katyr-Yurt through what they thought was a
safe corridor. In its defense, the government
again argued that its use of force was consistent
with Article 2, Section 2 of the Convention. In
this case, the Court accepted this argument,
noting that the “undisputed presence of a very
large group of armed fighters in Katyr-Yurt
and their active resistance might have justified
the use of lethal force by State agents.” The
Court also reasoned, however, that a balance
still had to be struck “between the aim pursued
and the means employed.” The Court held,
based on the documents submitted by the parties and the investigation file, which it again
noted was incomplete, that the Russian military’s use of indiscriminate weapons stood “in
flagrant contrast” with the protection of lives
from unlawful violence, which should have
been the primary aim of its operation. The
Court found that the military’s actions, therefore, could not be “considered compatible with
the standard of care prerequisite to an operation of this kind.” Furthermore, in view of the
military’s use of high explosion aviation bombs
and the fact that no state of emergency had
been declared at the time, which, under Article
15, would have permitted the government’s
derogation from certain Convention obligations, the military’s objective under Article 2,
Section 2 could not be considered proportional to the level of force used. Although the
Court accepted that the operation in KatyrYurt from February 4 to 7, 2000, did pursue a
legitimate aim, it found a violation of Article 2
because the attack was not “planned and executed with the requisite care for the lives of the
civilian population.”
With respect to the investigations the government was obliged to undertake into the
attacks, the Court noted in Khashiyev and
Akayeva v. Russia that they were flawed by considerable delays and “a number of serious and
unexplained failures to act once the investigation had commenced.” As a result, the Court
unanimously held that Russian authorities
failed to carry out effective investigations into
the assaults on the applicants and their relatives
in each of the cases brought before the Court,
violating Article 2 of the Convention.
With respect to the Article 3 allegations of
torture in Isayeva, Yusupova and Bazayeva, the
Court found that the applicants’ complaints
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were a consequence of the illegal use of lethal
force in violation of Article 2. Separate issues,
therefore, did not arise under Article 3. The
Court did find in Khashiyev and Akayeva
that the government’s failure to conduct a
thorough and effective investigation into what
it conceded were “credible allegations of
torture” violated Article 3’s procedural requirement, although it did not find that the treatment of applicants’ relatives met the requisite
“reasonable doubt” standard. No complaints
under Article 3 were submitted in Isayeva
v. Russia.
In light of its Article 2, 3, and Protocol
No. 1 findings, the Court further held that the
applicants’ complaints were all “arguable”
under Article 13’s “effective remedy” provision.
Because the criminal investigations in each case
suffered from serious shortcomings and lacked
“sufficient objectivity and thoroughness,” the
Court noted that the effectiveness of any other
remedy under Russian law, including civil
remedies, had been incurably undermined. In
Khashiyev and Akayeva and Isayeva, Judge
Zagrebelsky dissented on the same grounds he
expressed in the Court’s majority opinion,
holding the government’s preliminary objections unfounded. Judge Anatoli Kovler of
Russia joined in Zagrebelsky’s dissent. The
Court ordered the Russian government to pay
approximately 136,000 EUR in pecuniary and
non-pecuniary damages to the applicants.

INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM
THE INTER-AMERICAN HUMAN RIGHTS system
was created with the adoption of the American
Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man
(Declaration) in 1948. In 1959, the InterAmerican Commission on Human Rights
(Commission) was established as an independent organ of the Organization of the American
States (OAS) and it held its first session one
year later. In 1969, the American Convention
on Human Rights (Convention) was adopted.
The Convention further defined the role of the
Commission and created the Inter-American
Court of Human Rights (Court). According to
the Convention, once the Commission determines the case is admissible and meritorious, it
will make recommendations and, in some
cases, present the case to the Court for adjudication. The Court hears these cases, determines responsibility under relevant regional
treaties and agreements, and assesses and
awards damages and other forms of reparation
to victims of human rights violations.
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THE DEMOBILIZATION PROCESS
IN COLOMBIA
For more than forty years, Colombia has
been embroiled in a bloody civil conflict
involving the government, paramilitary forces,
and guerilla organizations. This era of violence
in Colombia has resulted in an estimated
4,000 politically-motivated non-combatant
deaths and 3,000 kidnappings each year. Since
1985, nearly three million people have been
forcibly displaced from their homes. Rightwing paramilitaries are responsible for 60 to 80
percent of all human rights violations. In July
2004, the Colombian government officially
initiated its first peace process with the country’s paramilitary umbrella group, the United
Self Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC).
In February 2004, while the terms of the
peace talks were being discussed, the
Permanent Council for the Member States of
the Organization of American States expressed
its “unequivocal support” for the Colombian
government’s attempts to secure lasting peace
through demobilization efforts with the AUC.
In accordance with its obligations to ensure
that member states comply with international
human rights and humanitarian law, the OAS
invited the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights to advise the OAS mission in
Colombia on that country’s demobilization
process and to report on the government’s
adherence to its international legal obligations.
Of particular concern were various proposals
to grant amnesties to the paramilitaries in
exchange for demobilization.

THE COMMISSION’S REPORT
The Commission issued its report on the
Colombian demobilization process in
December 2004. The report examines the
history of the Colombian conflict and the
government’s past attempts at achieving
peace. Although the report commends the
Colombian government for its past and
present attempts to end the country’s civil conflict, it reminds the government that it must
comply with international human rights
standards while disarming the paramilitaries
and guerillas.
The Commission’s report emphasizes that
whenever crimes against humanity, war crimes,
or human rights violations occur in the course
of armed conflict, customary international law
and treaty law require the state to investigate
the facts and prosecute and punish those
responsible. Because these crimes constitute
serious violations of international law, they are

not subject to amnesty and the state is required
to establish the individual criminal liability of
the persons involved.

Such exceptions would keep the most egregious human rights violators from benefiting
from the amnesty program.

In its analysis of Colombia’s demobilization
process, the report relies on Inter-American
Court of Human Rights (Court) case law.
The Court has consistently ruled that “selfamnesties” for acts committed by paramilitaries, such as those promulgated by transitional governments in El Salvador, Argentina,
Chile, Uruguay, and Peru, are illegal. The
Court found that such amnesty programs
violate international human rights law and are
incompatible with the American Convention
on Human Rights (Convention) because,
among other things, they preclude punishment
of human rights abuses. There has been no
jurisprudence thus far, however, on whether
amnesties for illegal armed actors are permisable.

The Colombian government has tried to
negotiate with the AUC to establish a legal
framework that would encourage demobilization of its members who would otherwise be
ineligible for amnesty because of their involvement in gross human rights abuses. Colombian
civil society organizations and the international community criticized this initiative
because it would allow lighter sentences for
persons who have committed serious violations
of human rights or international humanitarian
law, or both. As a result, this plan was withdrawn and subsequently revised.

In addition, the Court has indicated in previous cases that simply investigating facts and
prosecuting persons responsible for human
rights violations are not sufficient to ensure
that the rights recognized by the Convention
are satisfied. Rather, the Court has held that
States Parties must also make reparations to the
injured party or his next-of-kin. When this is
not possible, the State Party should pay compensation or provide rehabilitation such as
medical and psychological care and legal or
other social services. Other appropriate remedies delineated by the Court are the cessation
of continuing violations, the investigation and
verification of acts constituting international
crimes, public disclosure of the results of such
investigations, search for the remains of the
dead or disappeared, and public recognition of
the human rights violations.

THE PROPOSED AMNESTY PROGRAM
One of the Commission’s central concerns
is that the government’s proposed demobilization process will deprive the victims, the
country, and the international community of
potential trials that would air the truth and
provide reparations for victims. The primary
incentive for the paramilitaries to participate in
the demobilization process is preclusion from
or dismissal of investigations into violations of
human rights or humanitarian law they may
have committed. These benefits are only available, however, to those who confess, those who
have been accused of or tried for political
crimes, and those who have not yet been convicted. The benefits do not extend to those
who have been involved in conduct constituting “atrocious acts of ferocity or barbarism,
terrorism, kidnapping, genocide or homicide.”
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The revised plan, introduced in April
2004, offered “alternative penalties” for human
rights violators. The plan defines “alternative
penalty” as a deprivation of liberty for a period
not less than five years and not greater than ten
years. Such penalties would be much less
severe than those ordinarily imposed under
criminal law.
Under this plan, a “Tribunal for Truth,
Justice, and Reparation” (Tribunal) would
issue an opinion determining whether judgeimposed criminal sentences should be
enforced. Upon a favorable opinion from the
Tribunal, the individual would be given an
“alternative penalty,” escaping a harsher criminal penalty. The Commission determined
that this plan would render punishments that
are not proportional to the nature, magnitude,
or frequency of the crimes committed by the
offenders, because they would not be nearly
as severe as the penalties criminal courts
would impose.
Those found guilty of committing atrocious crimes would not be eligible for the general amnesty. Nonetheless, the Commission
voiced concern that illegal armed groups that
have not been formally investigated, but are
responsible for committing crimes against
civilians, would enjoy impunity under this
plan. The Commission fears that there would
be no judicial proceedings for persons who
have not been tried or convicted prior to their
demobilization, resulting in impunity for
human rights abusers.
The gaps and ambiguities of the various
proposed bills and initiatives leave the scope of
procedural benefits unclear, creating legal
uncertainty for all parties involved. The
Commission’s report criticizes the high level of
impunity and ineffectiveness of the administration of justice in Colombia. It demands that
continued on page 41
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of the victim.”
The Trial Chamber noted that the “victims’
lack of consent to the rapes” was adequately
established by the facts that Gacumbitsi threatened to kill them in an atrocious manner if
they resisted, and that the victims who did flee
were attacked. It is unclear from this statement
whether the Trial Chamber found the defendant’s threat or use of force necessary to establish the victim’s lack of consent. Earlier
jurisprudence by the Trial Chamber in
Semanza and Kajelijeli has established that
non-consent should be “assessed within the
context of the surrounding circumstances.”
This standard was supported by the ICTY
Appeals Chamber in Kunarac, which then clarified that although “[f ]orce or threat of force
provides clear evidence of non-consent, . . .
force is not an element per se of rape.” It determined that
[t]here are ‘factors [other than force]
which would render an act of sexual
penetration non-consensual or nonvoluntary on the part of the victim.’ A
narrow focus on force or threat of force
could permit perpetrators to evade liability for sexual activity to which the
other party had not consented by taking advantage of coercive circumstances
without relying on physical force.
Significantly, it noted that “the circumstances . . . that prevail in most cases charged
as either war crimes or crimes against humanity will be almost universally coercive. That is to
say, true consent will not be possible.”

Similarly, in Blaskic, the ICTY Trial Chamber
allowed the cumulative application of personal
responsibility and command responsibility, but
in more recent cases, such as Krstic, Krnojelac,
and Naletilic & Martinovic, the Trial Chamber
has determined that only the mode of responsibility that most appropriately expresses the
accused’s culpability should be charged.
Nevertheless, in sentencing Gacumbitsi,
the Trial Chamber considered that his “active
participation in the said crimes explain[ed]
why he could not take measures [as a superior]
to prevent or punish the perpetrators” and
was an aggravating factor. In doing so, it
appears to have adopted the view of the
Ntagerura et al. Trial Chamber that the
alternative (uncharged) form of responsibility
should be considered in sentencing “in order
to reflect the totality of the accused’s culpable
conduct.”
HRB

Mario Cava, a J.D. candidate at the Washington College
of Law, covers the ICC for the Human Rights Brief.
Tejal Jesrani, a J.D. candidate at the Washington College
of Law, covers Darfur for the Human Rights Brief.
Christian De Vos, a J.D. candidate at the Washington
College of Law, wrote the ICTR summary for the
Human Rights Brief.
Anna Triponel, an LL.M. candidate at the Washington
College of Law, wrote the ICTR summary for the
Human Rights Brief.
Anne Heindel, Assistant Director of the War Crimes
Research Office at the Washington College of Law, edited
the ICTR Summaries.

Because the Trial Chamber determined
that Gacumbitsi was personally responsible for
genocide and the crimes against humanity of
extermination and rape under Article 6(1) of
the ICTR Statute, it deemed it unnecessary to
decide whether he could also be held responsible as a superior under Article 6(3), because
these forms of responsibility “cannot be
charged cumulatively on the same basis of
facts. In case of cumulative charging, the Trial
Chamber will retain only the form of responsibility that best describes the Accused’s culpable
conduct.” This view seems to be in accord with
a movement by both Tribunals towards alternative charging under these articles. For example, the Kayishema Trial Chamber found that
these two forms of responsibility are “not
mutually exclusive,” but the more recent
Ntagerura et al. Trial Judgment found that they
are alternative modes of responsibility.

REGIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS SYSTEMS
continued from page 32

future investigations be handled in a way that
complies with the state’s international obligations, especially because so many victims are
reluctant to come forward and report these
human rights abuses for fear of retaliation.
The Commission’s report also focuses on
the Colombian government’s role in permitting the proliferation and impunity of paramilitary groups. The Commission is concerned that, despite their commitment to a
ceasefire agreement as a condition of the
demobilization process, AUC members continue to be implicated in serious human rights
violations, including massacres of defenseless
civilians; the selective assassinations of social
leaders, trade unionists, human rights defenders, judicial officers and journalists; and acts of
torture, harassment, and intimidation.
Although the Colombian government
claims it does not have an official policy of
encouraging paramilitary activity, the
Commission report reminds the government
that, under jurisprudence of the interAmerican system, the lack of an official policy
is insufficient to relieve any government of
liability for allowing paramilitary groups to
flourish. The Court and the Commission have
previously held governments responsible for
violating the Convention when state agents
acquiesce to paramilitary activities. The
Commission report calls on the Colombian
government to recognize its own responsibility
in facilitating the formation of some of the
paramilitary groups that have participated in
civilian massacres and other human rights
violations and criticizes it for failing to take the
measures necessary to prohibit, prevent, and
punish their criminal activities.
The Commission concludes that in order
to comply with international legal standards,
Colombia must uncover the truth of what has
happened in its civil conflict, including the
degree of government involvement in paramilitary activity. The Commission further recommends that the Colombian government adopt
a comprehensive legal framework that establishes clear conditions for the demobilization
of illegal armed groups to ensure that human
rights abusers are held accountable.
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